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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GLEN WAYNE NIELSON and
CHERYL E. NIELSON, husband and
wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
ROBERT TALBOT and MICHELE
TALBOT, husband and wife,

Supreme Court of
Idaho
Case No. 44864

and
PAUL PARKER AND SAUNDRA
PARKER, husband and wife,
Defendants/Respondents.

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR FRANKLIN COUNTY
THE HONORABLE JUDGE NAFTZ, PRESIDING

Blake S. Atkin
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorney for Appellants

Lane V. Erickson
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE &
BAILEY CHARTERED
201 East Center, P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Facsimile: (208) 232-7352
Attorney for Respondents
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THE ANCIENT CAMPBELL CASE MUST BE READ IN LIGHT OF THE LATER
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESENCE CAUSE OF ACTION
The Parker and Talbot brief demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of the
common law and the way in which causes of action develop. As cases are decided, the elements
of a cause of action begin to emerge. As later cases focus on different aspects of a particular
type of dispute new elements required to establish the cause of action are developed. In our legal
system, it is the duty of the courts and lawyers to coalesce those precedents in order to distill
from them the elements that must be proved to establish the common law cause of action. In this
case, Plaintiffs were deeded land by metes and bounds. That metes and bounds description in
their deed created a prima facie case that the Plaintiffs were the owners of the property therein
described. Defendants disputed that ownership. It was incumbent on them to identify the legal
theory they were pursuing that would deprive Plaintiffs of ownership of a portion of the property
they thought they owned. One such legal theory is the doctrine of boundary by agreement or
acquiescence. Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has three elements: (1) there must be an
uncertain or disputed boundary, (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary, and (3)
subsequent purchasers must be put on notice of the boundary that is different from their deed.
Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P. 3d 167 (2005). The fact pattern presented to the court
was a supposed agreement that the boundary would be different from that contained in the
contract the parties drew up that contained a clear metes and bounds description. The problem
for the Defendants was that there was never the element of an uncertain or disputed boundary.
Without such uncertainty or dispute there is no consideration for the supposed agreement and
one of the necessary elements of the cause of action for boundary by agreement or acquiescence
cannot be met.
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That an early Idaho case did not happen to discuss the element of uncertainty or dispute
that provides the necessary support for ignoring the clear metes and bounds description, one of
the later developed elements of the cause of action, is of no moment. All of the relevant
precedent must be applied to arrive at a just and satisfying result in the later cases. In this case,
the fact that the ancient Campbell 1case did not explore the necessity for a dispute between the
parties to provide the consideration for a boundary by agreement or acquiescence does not give
license to the trial court to ignore later cases such as Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P. 3d
167 (2005) that synthesizes the agreement element of the cause of action with the dispute
element of the cause of action for boundary by acquiescence. If this Court were to accept
Defendants’ argument, the Luce case with its holding that there are three elements to a cause of
action for boundary by agreement or acquiescence would be written out of our common law.
Indeed, early on Defendants’ recognized this case as a case of boundary by acquiescence.
Only later, when it became apparent that the facts would not support a claim of boundary by
agreement or acquiescence did the new argument begin. Only after the facts demonstrated that
there had never been any uncertainty or dispute to be resolved by agreement between the parties
was it argued that a case following this fact pattern could be decided without the essential
element of a dispute or uncertainty as to the location of that boundary line. Such sloppy analysis
is not worthy of the noble common law system we embrace in this state.
UNDER OUR SYSTEM, A CASE CANNOT BE TRIED ON COMPETING AFFIDAVITS
As Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiffs did raise a genuine issue of material fact
through submission of the affidavit of Vince Whitehead that refuted the so-called undisputed

1

Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 89, 245 P.2d 1052, 1057 (1952).
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facts on which Defendants relied in their motion for summary judgment and their brief in this
appeal.
Mr. Whitehead was the builder who built the home the Defendants now live in. In his
affidavit he stated that when he came on the property twenty years ago there was no fence. At
the time Vince Whitehead bought the property there was neither a fence nor lilac bushes. See
Appendix, Exhibit D; Clerk’s Record on Appeal at p.p. 250-251. When he bought the property
the fence did not exist and he could not discern a boundary line on the ground. Appendix,
Exhibit D; Clerk’s Record on Appeal at p.p. 250-251. There were no sprinkler systems. There
was no shed. There was no carport. In short, the fence was removed before any of the
“landmarks” on which defendants now rely were later added. The person who built the shed had
never seen the fence. The person who built the sprinkler system had never seen the fence. The
person who planted the lilacs had never seen the fence. The person who built the carport had
never seen the fence.
When that testimony is coupled with the testimony of Craig Shaffer that he and the
Murdocks believed that the legal description they had prepared pinpointed the location of the
fence, and he would not have signed the deed had he believed that the legal description did not
accurately define the boundary of the property. Appendix, Exhibit E; Clerk’s Record on Appeal
at p.p. 152-154; See Appendix, Exhibit S; Clerk’s Record on Appeal at p.p. 147-148. One is left
with confidence that the fence was not actually located where the other markers now exist. At
least there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the fence coincided with the markers to
which the Defendants now point.
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Nor is it of any moment in a summary judgment proceeding that the Defendants produced
a second affidavit of Mr. Whitehead in which he states that he cannot be sure his memory of
what happened 20 years ago is accurate. Such a later affidavit, while perhaps creating a genuine
issue of material fact cannot be allowed to circumvent Plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial. It is not
difficult to perceive a line of questioning where Mr. Whitehead is on the stand and the Plaintiffs’
lawyer pulls out his first affidavit and asks “When first asked about the fence, you testified that
the fence was gone when you arrived on the scene? He answers, “that is correct.” The lawyer
asks, “and it was only after that testimony was called into question did you agree that your
memory of what happened 20 years ago may not be accurate?” He responds, “that is correct.”
“But your first recollection was that the fence was gone when you first visited the property
twenty years ago.” He answers, “that is correct.” Given that questioning, a jury very well might
conclude that the fence was gone when Mr. Whitehead arrived on the scene to build Defendants’
house, and therefore all the so-called markers of the fence line were installed after the fence was
long gone, by people who had never seen the fence. Those are the kind of issues that trials are
made of. It was inappropriate on this record for the trial court to grant summary judgment.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2017.
Atkin Law Offices

___
Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of September, 2017, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF was served upon each of the following individuals
by causing the same to be delivered by the method and to the address indicated below:
Lane V. Erickson
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY CHARTERED
201 East Center
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Facsimile: (208) 232-7352
Email: lve@racinelaw.net

X Federal Express

Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals
451 W. State Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
sctbriefs@idcourts.net

X Federal Express

E-mail

E-mail

Dated this 28th day of September, 2017.
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